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Statement Showing Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals, under Utah Code
Annotated § 78A-4-103, to hear appeals from the district court involving domestic cases,
including but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody,
support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity.
Statement of the Issues
Issue I:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding a substantial

change of circumstances that warranted granting the petition for modification.
Standard of Review: When claiming that a trial court has abused its discretion in
finding a substantial and material change of circumstances, the challenging party must
properly marshal the evidence. See Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ^ 15, 221 P.3d
888. In order to challenge the determination of a substantial material change of
circumstances, the appellant must show that the trial court abused its discretion. See
Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, % 20, 9 P.3d 171.
Supporting Authority: Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1985); Smith
v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, ^ 8, 995 P.2d 14; Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah
Ct. App 1990).
Issue II: Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to bar modification to a
decree if the trial court properly finds a substantial change of circumstances.
Standard of Review: Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review "a party
must first raise the issue in the trial court giving that court an opportunity to rule on the
1

issue." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, ^ 17, 38 P.3d 307. If the issue of res
judicata is properly raised, this court would then review the question of whether res
judicata bars an action as a question of law for correctness, affording no particular
deference to the trial court. Busch v. BuscK 2003 UT App 131, % 5, 71 P.3d 177.
Supporting Authority: Macris & Associates v. Neways, Inc. 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d
1214 (Utah, 2000); Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988); Searle v.
Searle, 2001 UT App 367, % 17, 38 P.3d 307; O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ^ 18, 217 P.3d
708; Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah 1982); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410
(1990); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Kelley
v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, \ 21, 9 P.3d 171; Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT. App. 283 fflf
12-15 191 P.3d 1242.
Issue HI:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the child

support obligation.
Standard of Review: The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ^f 7, 157
P.3d 341. This court reviews the trial court's legal determinations regarding a parent's
entitlement to child support modification for correctness. Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App
306, lj 9, 221 P.3d 888. Further, appellate courts will interpret a statute "according to its
plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of the statute." Black v. Black, 2008 UT App 465, f
7 199 P.3d 371 (quoting Brinkerhoffv. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah Ct. App
1997).
2

Supporting Authority: Utah Code Ann. §78B-12-210(8); Rule 24(a) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367,1f 17, 38 P.3d 307
O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, f 18, 217 P.3d 708; Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, ^ 24,
186 P.3d 978; Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 216,16, 138 P.3d 63 (mem).
Issue IV:

Whether Appellant failed to preserve the argument for appeal that the

trial court improperly retroactively applied the child support modification.
Standard of Review: Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review "a party
must first raise the issue in the trial court giving that court an opportunity to rule on the
issue." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, f 17, 38 P.3d 307. More specifically, "(1)
the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and
(3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." O 'Dea v.
Olea, 2009 UT 46, If 18,217 P.3d 708
Supporting Authority: Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure; Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, U 24, 186 P.3d 978; Connell v. Connell,
2010 UT App 139,124,233 P.3d 836.
Issue V:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the decree to

require Corey to pay one-half of school related expenses.
Standard of Review:

The determination to modify a divorce decree is generally

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ^ 7, 157
P.3d341.
Supporting Authority: Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3); Utah Code Ann. §78B-12210; Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, U 27, 80 P.3d 553; Anderson v. Thompson,
3

2008 UT App 3, THf 8,19, 176 P.3d 464; Arnold v. Arnold, 2008 UT App 17, f 10 n. 2
177 P.3d 89; Starley v. McDowell, 1999 UT App 46 (mem); Gillette v. Costa, 2007 UT
App 104, 2007 WL 858711 (not reported); Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 959, n. 4.
(Utah 1994).
Issue VI:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the decree to

allow reimbursement for medical expenses as they are incurred, rather than as they are
paid.
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination to modify a decree will be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ^| 7, 157
P.3d341.
Supporting Authority: Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-212; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12212(8); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-212(9); Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5; Covey v.
Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 27, 80 P.3d 553; Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ^[17, 160
P.3d 1041; J J. W. v. State, Div. of Child and Family Services, 2001 UT App 271,1J22, 33
P.3d 59.
Issue VII: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellee's
request for attorney fees.
Standard of Review: Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in deciding
whether to award attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings." Wilde v. Wilde,
2001 UT App 3 1 8 4 38> 3 5 p - 3 d 341. If a finding by the trial court is so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, it is clearly erroneous. Covey v.
Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, If 27, 80 P.3d 553.
4

Supporting Authority: Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1); Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT
App 233, If 45, 217 P.3d 733; Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,110, 176
P.3d 476; Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374,% 21, 223 P.3d 476; Connell v. Connell, 2010
UT App 139, If 32, 233 P.3d; Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Issue VIII: Whether Appellee is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
Standard of Review: Granting attorney fees on appeal is a determination for this
court to make rather than the trial court. Thus, no standard of review exists.
Supporting Authority: Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733;
Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, \ 29, 200 P.3d 223; Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d
508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).

Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-212
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
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Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case:
Corey lived and worked mostly out of state for the two years prior to the divorce.
(Record at 20). For the six month prior to divorce, Corey only provided $500 per month
in support to his wife an children, despite an income of $7,000 per month. (Record at 1920, 530). Lisa filed for divorce in February of 2002 and the divorce was granted on May
23, 2002. (Record at 99). Corey became delinquent in the child support and alimony
payments and failed to make mortgage payments on the home Lisa lived in with her three
young children. (Record at 530). Lisa moved out of the home as it was going into
foreclosure.
Corey filed for bankruptcy in 2003, but the effects of that have caused Lisa
substantial negative economic impact over the last several years. While Corey was
discharged on the marital debts that he was required to pay under the decree, Lisa's credit
has been negatively affected. She has been sued by creditors and has been forced to
make payments on debts that were Corey's to pay under the decree. While Corey moved
on and purchased another home, Lisa and her children have not been able to live in a
home of their own for the last nine years because of her ruined credit and because Corey
has not co-signed on a home loan as required under the decree. In her motion for
modification, Lisa asked for just four changes: (1) that the children's father pay for onehalf of the additional school expenses such as Advanced Placement exam fees, (2) that
Lisa be allowed to claim the children as exemptions for tax purposes, (3) that the child
support amount be amended to reflect Corey's increase in income, and (4) that Corey pay
his one-half share of medical expenses incurred by the children since he had refused to
6

pay any medical bills the prior year. The judge granted these requests, and then Corey
filed this appeal.
Course of Proceedings:
After Lisa filed her initial Petition for Modification, the parties filed additional
Petitions for Modification and Counter-Petitions. (Record at 633). The Trial court
combined all the petitions and held a bench trial on the modification petitions on January
28, 2010. (Record at 679). The parties appeared pro se, gave testimony, and the trial
court received exhibits relating to the modification proceedings.
Disposition of Proceedings:
On February 17, 2010, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order Modifying Decree. (Record at 679). The Trial court entered its Order on
Modification of Divorce Decree (January 28, 2010) on April 23, 2010. (Record at 725).
The trial court ordered that Corey's child support payments be increased to reflect the
increase in his income, that Lisa be allowed to claim the minor children as exemptions on
her taxes, that Corey pay for one-half of the children's reasonable school expenses, and
that the medical bills need to be reimbursed as they are incurred. The trial court also
denied Lisa's request for attorney fees. (Record at 723-725).
Statement of Relevant Facts
1.

Two years prior to the divorce, Corey moved out of state to work and for

the six months prior to Lisa's filing for divorce, paid only $500 a month toward
supporting his wife and three children, despite an income of $7,000 a month (Record at
19-20, 530).
7

2.

Lisa filed for divorce on February 19, 2002, with the decree being entered

on May 23, 2002. (Record, at 5, 99).
3.

The parties had three daughters at the time of the divorce, ages one, seven,

and ten. (Record at 4). Lisa has always had sole custody of the children. Corey has
exercised visitation rights only in the summer for the last several years. (Trial Transcript
at 5: 7-13; 75:18-24).
4.

Although ordered to pay child support, alimony payments, and mortgage

payments, Corey failed to do so as ordered and Lisa was forced to move from her home
where she had been living with her three young children, due to foreclosure. (Record at
530, 677).
5.

Corey filed a Petition for Modification in October 2002 seeking among

other things a reduction in child support and alimony. (Record at 120).
6.

Lisa filed an Answer and Counter-Petition for Modification in November

2002, seeking payment on delinquent child support payments. (Record at 124).
7.

Hearings were held on various motions and orders to show cause on

January 6, 2003, April 24, 2003, December 16, 2003, and August 3, 2004 and orders
were entered regarding those hearings. (Record at 532).
8.

Corey filed objections to some of the Commissioner's recommendation

regarding the hearings and the Court agreed to consolidate all Objections to be heard at
the 2005 modification hearing. (Record at 532).

8

9.

Corey received a discharge for bankruptcy in 2003, well after Corey filed

the Petition for Modification that was at the heart of the 2005 modification order.
(Record at 530).
10.

After the 2005 hearing on the motion for modification, the court found that

the only significant and material change in circumstances since the entry of the original
Divorce Decree was that Corey's income has been reduced approximately 29%. (Record
at 531, 529).
11.

The court found that Corey failed to pay the full amount of his child

support and alimony obligations, but that he had the ability to pay those obligations.
(Record at 530).
12.

The court found that Corey "received a discharge in bankruptcy in regard to

the debts and obligations he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce." (Record
at 530). This is the only mention of Corey's bankruptcy in the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The Order Modifying the Decree of Divorce makes no mention
whatsoever of the bankruptcy or its affects on Lisa. (Record at 538).
13.

The court found that Corey's income was reduced from $7,000.00 per

month to $5,026.00 per month since the original divorce decree. (Record at 529-530).
14.

The 2005 Decree modified the amount of alimony and child support,

allowed Corey to claim the youngest child as a dependent for tax purposes, and allowed
Lisa to claim the middle child. (Record at 536, 535). The 2005 Decree did not modify
the debts owed by the parties.

9

15.

The 2005 Decree states that "[a]ll other provisions of the Decree of Divorce

shall remain in full force and effect." (Record at 535).
16.

While Corey filed for bankruptcy in 2003, Lisa suffered the negative

economic affect of that bankruptcy after the 2005 modification. (Trial Transcript at
24:10-15). While Corey was discharged on the marital debts that he was required to pay
under the decree, Lisa's credit has been negatively affected. She has been sued by
creditors and has been forced to make payments on debts that were Corey's to pay under
the decree. (Record at 677-678). While Corey moved on and purchased another home,
Lisa and her children have not been able to live in a home of their own for the last nine
years because of her ruined credit and because Corey has not co-signed on a home loan as
required under the decree. (Record at 673; Trial Transcript 57:6-25; 58:1-25; 90:18-22).
17.

Through her attorney, Lisa filed the current petition for modification on

April 4, 2008. (Record at 559). In the petition, Lisa requested that she be allowed to
claim the minor children as exemptions for tax purposes, that Corey pay one-half of the
expenses incurred for the children for extra curricular activities, school registration, and
test fees, and that child support be amended to reflect an increase in Corey's income.
(Record at 558).
18.

Corey also requested attorney fees in her Petition to Modify. (Record at

19.

Lisa's attorney withdrew from representation in late 2009 and Lisa

558).

represented herself at trial. (Record at 5 88).

10

20.

Lisa filed another pleading pro se on November 23, 2008, in which she

outlines debts owed by Corey under the decree that were not being paid by him and for
which Lisa was being sued. (Record at 601).
21.

Lisa also requested that the child support amounts be adjusted. (Record at

22.

The filing also stated that Corey had failed to make any payments toward

599).

medical and dental bills for the year 2009. (Record at 600).
23.

At trial, Lisa testified that she usually submitted medical statements to

Corey within thirty days for reimbursement, but that Corey wanted more statements back
from Lisa from the medical providers that she may not be able to provide. (Trial
Transcript at 100: 2-4). Lisa testified that Corey is "always asking for more
documentation that I don't" have. (Trial Transcript at 103: 13-14, court interrupted
testimony). To remedy these problems, the trial court determined that all Lisa was
required to do is send the statement to Corey showing that the bill was incurred and he
would be obligated to pay his one-half share. (Trial Transcript at 100-104). The Court
justified the idea that Corey should pay his one-half of the medical bills when incurred,
rather than when paid, because if Lisa incurred the medical bill (because she has custody
of the children and makes sure their medical needs are met), the providers could not
"come after" Corey for those bills, but that Lisa would be solely liable. (Trial Transcript
at 100: 12-25, 101: 1).
24.

At the beginning of trial, the Judge stated at trial: "I have to tell you this.

On the issue of bankruptcy - since the bankruptcy was filed in 2003 and since you had a
11

bench trial in 2005, any issues relating to the effect of the bankruptcy should have been
brought up at that trial, because I - my reading is the judge actually put in his findings
and decree something about the bankruptcy." (Trial Transcript 24:4-9)
25.

Lisa then testified that [The bankruptcy] wasn't hurting my credit until

after that trial," meaning the trial on the motion for modification in 2005. The judge
asked, "Because then the creditors have come after you?" Mrs. Davis responded, "Yes,
If s on my credit report." (Trial Transcript 24: 10-15).
26.

Lisa testified that her credit was being ruined, that she was being sued by

the credit card companies on bills owed by Corey under the decree. Corey responded that
he "had a problem with this" because "[t]hey're not my debts" because of the bankruptcy.
(Trial Transcript at 72:17-25; 73:1-9).
27.

In its findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, The trial court, citing

Kinsman, determined that "[w]hen Mr. Davis agrees to assume and pay certain debts for
the benefit of a petitioner such as Mrs. Davis, that is a promise upon which the petitioner
can rely. While the creditors no longer can go against the respondent because of the
bankruptcy, the petitioner can because the original decree in this matter placed upon
respondent obligation to pay those bills." See Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah
App. 1988). (Record at 671, 672).
28.

At the end of trial, the judge stated that "the bankruptcy is having a terrible

effect on your financial condition." (Trial Transcript at 107:22-24).
29.

At trial, after the trial court asked Lisa about attorney fees she had incurred

regarding the petition to modify, Lisa testified that she had requested invoices from her
12

attorney, Mr. Nemelka, and "gathered what I could get" from Mr. Nemelka, "which is not
even half of what I've occurred with Nemelka." "He's been in physical therapy and
operations. So it's been kind of hard to get hold of him to try and get all the invoices
from the last two years." (Trial Transcript 8:8-15).
30.

The Judge then stated, "But you are seeking those fees," to which Lisa

responded, "yes." (Trial Transcript 8:16-18).
31.

Lisa presented invoices from her attorney to the judge and the judge

responded, "Those are invoices from your lawyer?" To which Lisa responded, "Yes."
Corey then stated, "They are her attorney fees, your honor. It's okay." (Trial Transcript
74:21-25; 75:1-5). The Judge later stated, as to "[ajttorney fees," "You've incurred
them." (Trial Transcript 96:8-10).
32.

Lisa submitted as exhibits three invoices from attorney Richard S.

Nemelka. The invoices show time billed on work done by Mr. Nemelka for the Lisa.
The first invoice covers work done from 5/8/2009 to 6/27/2009, totaling $623. The work
included conferences with the client, revising documents, conference with the court, court
scheduling, and drafting responses. The second invoice covers time billed from July 1,
2009 until July 29, 2009, totaling $265.50. This work included review of documents,
conference with client, and drafting pleadings. The third invoice covers October 23,
2009 until December 5, 2009, totaling $489.00 and included sending letters, attending a
hearing, reviewing pleadings, drafting letters, and conferencing. (Trial Exhibit #11).
The total for attorney fees requested was $1,377.50.

13

33.

The corresponding pleadings in the record show that at this same time

frame, Richard Nemelka filed a notice to submit for ruling Lisa's motion to schedule a
trial on the motion for modification. (Record at 571). The trial was rescheduled,
requiring Mr. Nemelka's attention. (Record at 582). Mr. Nemelka attended a pretrial
hearing/scheduling conference for Lisa regarding the modification. (Record at 588). He
filed an Order for Scheduling Conference. (Record at 604). The record shows that
Corey filed a Counter Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce (Record at 587),
and various other motions and requests during this time that Lisa's counsel would have
reviewed, including a Motion for Order to Reschedule (Record at 578), a summons
(Record at 592), and another Counter Petition for Modification (Record at 596).
34.

The trial court concluded regarding attorney fees: "The evidence at trial

was insufficient for this court to determine attorney fees in this matter, specifically
whether the attorney fees are related to the issues which have been adjudicated here.
Accordingly, the court does not find that attorney fees should be awarded in this case."
(Record at 670).
35.

The trial court determined that a substantial change of circumstances had

occurred, (Record at 677) and also found the following findings amounting to a
substantial change in circumstances:
a.
b..
c.

The court states that "[o]ne of the children has now turned 18."
(Record at 677).
"[T]he bankruptcy of the respondent has materially affected the
financial condition of the petitioner." (Record at 677).
"[I]ssues of school expenses have arisen that did not exist when the
decree was entered." (Record at 677).
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d.
e.

f.

g.

36.

"[B]y virtue of that bankruptcy filing, the creditors are now seeking
to recover funds from the petitioner." (Record at 677, 678).
Corey was required to pay for certain debts under the decree and
"the court finds that those debts have not been paid." (Record at
677).
"[Although bankruptcy was a right respondent could and did
invoke, that by doing so he has effectively taken from the petitioner
the benefit of her bargain in arriving at the stipulation which was the
basis of the original decree." (Record at 677).
"The Court also finds that the parties' incomes have changed
significantly, most significantly being that of the respondent."
(Record at 676).

The court found that Corey was making $6,248.00 per month. The court

found that Lisa was making $1,273 per year. (Record at 675).
37.

The court found that Lisa had reasonable monthly expenses of $4,027.99

per month, that Corey had reasonable monthly expenses of $2,224.00, that these figures
were unlikely to change, and that these figures were appropriate for use in determining
child support. (Record at 675). The court ordered child support to be raised $113 a
month. (Record at 675).
38.

In her petition for modification, Lisa stated that because she had incurred

additional expenses for the minor children for extracurricular activities, school
registration, test fees, and other expenses, that it would be reasonable that Corey pay onehalf of the expenses incurred for the children for these extra expenses. (Record at 558).
39.

At trial, Lisa testified that the minor children had been incurring additional

expenses as they became older and were in high school. She testified that they were
incurring extra expenses such as registration fees, book fees, advanced placement tests
fees, and lab fees. (Trial Transcript at 65:15; 66:1-15; 67:1-22; 95:14-25; 96:1-3). The
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trial court made the factual finding that school expenses "have arisen that did not exist
when the decree was entered" and that this constituted a material change in
circumstances. (Record at 677).
40.

The court then ordered that the decree be modified to require Corey to

reimburse Lisa for one-half of reasonable school expenses. (Record at 668)..
Summary of Argument
Issue I:

Corey has failed to marshal the evidence outlined by the trial court to

support the court's finding of a material and substantial change of circumstances.
Because Corey has failed to marshal the evidence, this court should assume the evidence
supports the findings. Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318,fflf29-30, 35 P.3d 341. Even if
he had properly marshaled the evidence, Corey fails to show that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding a substantial material change of circumstances. See Kelley v.
Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 20, 9 P.3d 171.
Issue II: Corey did not adequately preserve the argument of res judicata upon
which the trial court could make a ruling, thereby preventing this court from ruling on the
issue. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, ^ 17, 38 P.3d 307 (for appellate review "a
party must first raise the issue in the trial court giving that court an opportunity to rule on
the issue"). Further, because the trial court found a substantial change in circumstances
had occurred since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself, res
judicata cannot apply to bar Lisa's claims. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, ^f 21, 9
P.3d 171.
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Issue III: Corey fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the
child support obligation because Corey did not object to the trial court's modification of
child support and therefore waived the issue for appeal and because the trial court made
sufficient findings to warrant adjustment of the Respondent's obligations.
Issue IV: Because Corey failed to object to the trial court's retroactive application
of the child support modification or raise the issue at the trial court level, he failed to
preserve the issue for appeal. Rule 24(a)(5), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Connell
v. Connell 2010 UT App 139, f 24, 233 P.3d 836.
Issue V: Corey failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
him to pay for one-half of the children's reasonable school expenses. First, he failed to
properly marshal the evidence. See Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 27, 80 P.3d
553. Second, despite Corey's assertions to the contrary, the trial court made adequate
findings regarding the school expense issues. Third, the trial court was legally able to
make the school fee award. See Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3,fflf8, 19, 176
P.3d 464 (court found enforceable requirement that husband pay for children's
extracurricular activities separate and apart from child support order).
Issue VI: Corey failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
Corey to pay out of pocket medical costs as they are incurred, without having to receive
proof of actual payment. First, he failed to marshal the evidence in his challenge to the
trial court's findings. Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, % 27, 80 P.3d 553. Second,
the trial court made specific findings that justified the modification. Third, the trial court
did not violate Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-212 when it ordered that his reimbursement
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obligations for of out-of-pocket health care costs are triggered upon Lisa incurring such
costs.
Issue VII: The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Lisa's request for
attorney fees. The trial court did not make statutory findings based upon the evidence of
Lisa's financial need or the ability of Corey to pay. See Kimball v. Kimball, ^ 45, 217
P.3d 733; § 30-3-3(1). Regarding the last factor, the reasonableness of the fee, the only
finding the trial court made, was that "[t]he evidence at trial was insufficient for this court
to determine attorney fees in this matter, specifically whether the attorney fees are related
to the issues which have been adjudicated here." This finding is so lacking in support as
to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making it clearly erroneous. Covey v.
Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, % 27, 80 P.3d 553.
Issue VIII: Lisa should be awarded attorney fees incurred on appeal. Even
though the trial court improperly denied Lisa attorney fees, an appellate court may award
attorney fees on appeal if the party prevails on appeal and if the trial court should have
awarded attorney fees below. Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 52, 217 P.3d
733. If Lisa prevails in large part on this appeal, this court should exercise its discretion
and award attorney fees to Lisa incurred in this appeal.
Argument
I.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a substantial change of
circumstances that warranted granting Lisafs petition for modification.
In Point One of his brief, Corey challenges the trial court's determination that

there was a substamtial and material change of circumstances. Corey claims that the trial
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court made no findings supporting the award of modification and that the trial court
improperly looked to the original decree, and should only have looked to the 2005l
modification decree in determining whether a substantial and material change of
circumstances occurred. However, the essence of Corey's claim is that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding that a material and substantial change of circumstances
warranted the modification of the decree.
When claiming that a trial court has abused its discretion in finding a substantial
and material change of circumstances, the challenging party must properly marshal the
evidence.2 See Doyle v. Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, f 15, 221 P.3d 888 (determination of
whether substantial and material changes have occurred is a fact-intensive legal
determination requiring marshaling); Alban v. Alban, 2008 UT App 130, WL 963015
(party must marshal evidence in claim that trial court abused its discretion in finding that
a substantial change in circumstances warranted modification); Young v. Young, 2009 UT
App 3,fflf4,12, 201 P.3d 301 (husband failed to marshal evidence in challenging trial
court's determination of a substantial material change challenge); see also Kimball v.
Kimball, 2009 UT App 233,fflf20-22, 217 P.3d 733. The marshaling rule requires Corey
to marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then
1

Corey refers to the modification order as the "2006 Order" throughout his brief, but in
reality the order was signed and entered in 2005.
2
While challenges to pure questions of law do not require marshaling, Utah Auto Auction
v. Labor Comm yn, 2008 UT App 293, \ 9 n.4, 191 P.3d 1252, challenges that are fact
sensitive, such as whether a substantial and material change of circumstances have
occurred, require the marshaling effort and appellate courts have issued "frank severe
instruction" to "overly creative" parties who dodge this duty by attempting to frame factdependent issues as legal ones. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower
Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35,ffif19, 25, 140 P.3d 1200; Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, ^ 15.
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demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact. Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App
216? \ 6, 138 P.3d 63 (mem.) (finding wife failed to marshal all evidence in support of
the finding and then demonstrate that evidence was legally insufficient to support finding
even when viewing it in light most favorable to trial court).
Corey has failed to marshal the evidence outlined by the trial court to support the
court's finding of a material and substantial change of circumstances. Because Corey has
failed to marshal the evidence, this court should assume the evidence supports the
findings. Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318,1ft 29-30, 35 P.3d 341 (holding party failed
to meet her obligation to marshal evidence and thus, court assumed record supported trial
court's finding); Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^j 80 100 P.3d 1177. When a party fails
to marshal, this court may affirm the trial court's ruling on this basis alone. Id.
Accordingly, this court should dismiss Corey's first claim for failing to attempt, let alone
meet, the marshaling requirement.
Curiously, rather than marshaling the evidence, Corey merely asserts that the court
made "no finding of fact, or conclusion at law, that any substantial material change of
circumstances has occurred since that 2006 order." Corey is mistaken. The trial court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order states: "The court finds that a material
change in circumstances has occurred." (Record at 677). The Court outlines the
following findings of fact showing a material change of circumstances:
(1) The court states that "[o]ne of the children has now turned 18." (Record at
677).
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2.
"[T]he bankruptcy of the respondent has materially affected the financial
condition of the petitioner." (Record at 677).
3.
"[I]ssues of school expenses have arisen that did not exist when the decree
was entered." (Record at 677).
4.
"[B]y virtue of that bankruptcy filing, the creditors are now seeking to
recover funds from the petitioner." (Record at 677, 678).
5.
Corey was required to pay for certain debts under the decree and "the court
finds that those debts have not been paid." (Record at 677).
6.
"[Although bankruptcy was a right respondent could and did invoke, that
by doing so he has effectively taken from the petitioner the benefit of her bargain in
arriving at the stipulation which was the basis of the original decree." (Record at
677).
7.
"The court also finds that the parties' incomes have changed significantly,
most significantly being that of the respondent." (Record at 676).
Accordingly, despite Corey's assertions to the contrary, the trial court made several
findings that a substantial material change of circumstances had occurred.
In order to challenge the determination of a substantial material change of
circumstances, Corey must show that the trial court abused its discretion. See Kelley v.
Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, % 20, 9 P.3d 171.3 In an apparent attempt to do so, Corey
makes the argument, without any support or citation to any rule or case, that the trial
court should have referred only to the last final order on modification made in 2005 and
should not have looked to the original decree of divorce in the current modification
3

Corey appears to argue in his statement of the standard of review on this issue
that the findings made by the trial court are legally inadequate, presenting a question of
law. (Corey's Brief at 1). This argument is not made in the body of the brief, however.
Even if he had made this argument in the body of his brief, it too must fail. For example,
the court found that Corey has failed to make payments as outlined in the decree. Failure
of a party to maintain payments on debts allocated to him by decree forcing liability of
the other party is by itself sufficient to trigger a modification. See generally Thompson v.
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1985) (husband's failure to pay promissory note on auto
loan constituted changed circumstances when wife was thereby forced to assume
unintended financial obligations).
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determination. The only support Corey provides for his argument is his own statement
that "[ljogically and procedurally, this only makes sense." Briefs must contain a
reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. An issue is inadequately briefed
when the overall analysis of the issue is "so lacking as to shift the burden of research and
argument to the reviewing court." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, t 8, 995 P.2d 14.
Corey fails to cite a single legal authority for the proposition that a trial court must
disregard an original divorce decree if there is an intervening modification. Smith, 1999
UT App 370 f 10 (party fails to cite a single legal authority for proposition). Further
undercutting Corey's argument that the trial court was bound to disregard the original
Decree is the fact that the 2005 modification order specifically states that "all other
provisions of Decree of Divorce remain in full force and effect." (Record at 535).
Even if Corey were correct and somehow the trial court was prevented from
considering the original divorce decree, the trial court did make findings of substantial
circumstances that occurred after the 2005 order that were not contemplated in the decree
itself, and therefore could modify the relevant portions of the 2005 Decree without
abusing its discretion. See Durfee v. Dufree, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App 1990).
For example, the trial court determined that the daughter of the litigants had turned 18,
which occurred after 2005. The trial court determined that the issue of school expenses
was also a new issue. The court heard testimony that Lisa was having to pay expenses
for such items as Advanced Placement tests and other fees and expenses associated with
high school that were not being incurred in 2005 when the children were ages 13, 10, and
4. (Trial Transcript at 65:15-25, 66:1-25; 67:1-23). Further, the trial court found that the
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impact of the 2003 bankruptcy was negatively affecting Lisa now in ways not addressed
in the 2005 decree. Namely, the court pointed out that the bankruptcy was forcing Lisa
to pay for certain debts under the decree that were Corey's to pay because creditors were
now seeking to recover funds from the her. (Record at 677, 678). All these events
occurred after the 2005 Modification Decree. (Trial Transcript 24:1-15). The court
found that because of the affects of the bankruptcy that Lisa was now suffering under, she
had lost the benefit of her bargain in the original decree, a finding not addressed in 2005.
The trial court also found that since 2005, the parties' incomes had changed significantly,
most significantly being that of Corey. (Record at 676).
Corey's claim that the 2005 decree addressed all issues arising out of his 2003
bankruptcy is also incorrect. The 2005 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has one
sentence regarding the bankruptcy: Corey "received a discharge in bankruptcy in regard
to the debts and obligations he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce."
(Record at 530). This is the only mention of Corey's bankruptcy in the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. The 2005 Decree does not even mention the bankruptcy.
(Record at 538). The 2005 decree modified the amount of alimony and child support,
and permitted Corey to claim the youngest child as a dependent for tax purposes.
(Record at Record at 536, 535). The basis for this modification was Corey's changed
income, not his bankruptcy. (Record at 529). The 2005 order specifically did not alter
the other provisions of the original decree, including allocations of debt: "All other
provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force and effect." (Record at
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535). Therefore, Corey's claim that the 2005 order disposed of all issues relating to his
bankruptcy is incorrect.4
Because Corey did not properly marshal the evidence to challenge the trial court's
finding of a substantial change of circumstances, his argument must fail. Further, the
court made several adequate findings of fact that led to the determination of a substantial
change in circumstances. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that there had been a substantial and material change in circumstances.
II.
Because the trial court found that a substantial change in circumstances
occurred, the doctrine of res judicata does not operate as a bar to modification.
Corey next argues that the trial court was barred from entering an order of
modification due 1o the doctrine of res judicata. Corey specifically argues that the
standard for the claim preclusion branch of res judicata, as enunciated in Macris &
Associates v. Neways, Inc. 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah, 2000), operates as a bar to
the order of modification entered by the trial court. This argument fails first, because it
was not preserved below, and second, because the trial court made adequate findings of a
change in circumstances to overcome the bar of res judicata.

4

To the extent Corey is attempting to argue that he is absolved of his obligations
under any of the decrees because of his bankruptcy, the trial court, citing Kinsman,
properly found that "[W]hen Mr. Davis agrees to assume and pay certain debts for the
benefit of a petitioner such as Mrs. Davis, that is a promise upon which the petitioner can
rely. While the creditors no longer can go against the respondent because of the
bankruptcy, the petitioner can because the original decree in this matter placed upon
respondent obligation to pay those bills." (Record at 671); see Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748
P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988).
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First, although Corey stated in his Answer to Petition for Modification that Lisa's
Petition to Modify "is repetitive of the issues previously brought before this court and
were discussed at the time of the last trial/' he failed to make any argument of res
judicata upon which the trial court could make a ruling. (Record at 566). Generally, to
preserve an issue for appellate review "a party must first raise the issue in the trial court
giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App
367, % 17, 38 P.3d 307. More specifically, "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely
fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, % 18, 217
P.3d 708. Because Corey did not properly raise the issue or provide any relevant legal
authority to the trial court, Corey has failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal.
Had he properly raised the issue to the trial court and allowed the trial court to rule
on the matter, this court would then review the question of whether res judicata bars an
action as a question of law for correctness, affording no particular deference to the trial
court. Busch v. Busch, 2003 UT App 131, f 5, 71 P.3d 177.
Second, Corey's argument fails because the court made adequate findings of
changed circumstances. Corey argues that the claim preclusion branch of the doctrine as
enunciated in Macris applies. To satisfy the Macris standard a party must show that: 1)
both cases involve the same parties or privies; 2) the allegedly barred claim either was
presented in the previous suit or should have been presented in the previous suit; and 3)
the previous suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Macris, 2000 UT 93, ^ 20.
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Corey contends that all three elements are satisfied and that therefore Lisa's claims for
modification are barred.
The doctrine of res judicata applies in divorce actions and subsequent
modification proceedings. Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah 1982). However,
application ofres judicata in modification proceedings is distinguished because of the
equitable doctrine that allows courts to reopen determinations if a party can demonstrate
a substantial change of circumstances. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (1990);
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Additionally,
courts have continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) to enter
subsequent orders regarding the parties, their children, or their property "as is reasonable
and necessary."
Accordingly, res judicata will not apply to bar a claim if the trial court finds "that
a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree and not
contemplated in the decree itself" Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, H 21, 9 P.3d 171;
accord^ Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53-54 (Utah 1982) (domestic relations order may
be modified and the policy concerns underlying the doctrine of res judicata will be
safeguarded if a trial court modifies a divorce decree only after finding changed
circumstances); Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT. App. 283fflf12-15 191 P.3d 1242 (if party
can demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances, then res judicata principles do
not apply); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah App. 1990) {res judicata bars
modification proceedings only when moving party cannot establish substantial change of
circumstances).
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As discussed above, the trial court found a substantial change of circumstances
occurred since entry of the 2005 decree, and these changes were not contemplated in the
decree itself. For example, the trial court determined that the daughter of the litigants
had turned 18, that school expenses were being incurred that did not exist when the
decree was entered, that the impact of the 2003 bankruptcy was negatively affecting Lisa
now in ways not addressed in the 2005 decree such as forcing Lisa to pay debts under the
decree that were Corey's debts to pay, and that the parties' incomes had changed, most
significantly Corey's income.
Accordingly, because this issue was not preserved and because the trial court
found a substantial change of circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the
trial court's determination that the petition for modification should be granted and
Corey's claim must fail. See Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, If 21.
III.
The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Modifying the Child Support
Obligation.
Corey next argues that the trial court improperly modified the child support
obligation by increasing it $113.00 per month. The determination to modify a divorce
decree is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wall v. Wall, 2007
UT App 61, Tf 7, 157 P.3d 341. This court reviews the trial court's legal determinations
regarding a parent's entitlement to child support modification for correctness. Doyle v.
Doyle, 2009 UT App 306, f 9, 221 P.3d 888. Further, appellate courts will interpret a
statute "according to its plain language, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused,
inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of the statute." Black v.
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Black, 2008 UT App 465, *h 7 199 P.3d 371 (quoting Brinkerhoffv. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d
113, 115 (Utah Ct.App 1997)).
Corey's argument fails because first, Corey did not object to the trial court's
modification of child support and therefore waived the issue for appeal, and second the
trial court made sufficient findings to warrant adjustment of Corey's obligations.
Corey argues that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210(8) precludes the trial court from
modifying the award of child support and that this court should review the trial court's
statutory interpretation under a correction of error standard. However, Corey failed to
properly raise the issue with the trial court and there is no statutory interpretation or
analysis by the trial court for this court to review.
In her petition, Lisa asked for a modification of child support and the trial
transcript outlines the testimony of the parties regarding income as it relates to a potential
change in the child support award. However, Corey does not cite anywhere in the record
where a specific objection was raised before the trial court to the proposed change in the
award of child support, nor does he cite the above-mentioned statute or make an
argument that it precludes the trial court from modifying the child support award.
Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review "a party must first raise the
issue in the trial court giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Searle v.
Searle, 2001 UT App 367, ^ 17, 38 P.3d 307. More specifically, "(1) the issue must be
raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, %
18, 217 P.3d 708. Further, Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure obligates
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Corey to provide citations to the record demonstrating that an issue was preserved for
appeal, or statement showing that the trial court committed plain error.
Corey cites two sections of the trial transcript and one exhibit which he contends
preserved his argument that modification of child support was inappropriate under Utah
Code Annotated § 78B-12-210(8). Corey cites to the transcript at 52:18 through 53:3,
and 78:23 through 79:7. Corey also cites to Exhibit 3.
The transcript at 52:18-53:3 indicates that Lisa was aware that Utah Office of
Recovery Services ("ORS") would not petition the court for modification of child support
if there was not a change in income greater than 10%, but that she nevertheless requested
the Court to change child support, folly expecting Corey's income not to have changed
by greater than 10%. The transcript at 78:23 through 79:7 is simply Corey's description
of his Exhibit 3. Corey's Exhibit 3 is a letter from the ORS stating that they do not intend
to petition for modification of child support. These citations are limited to comment on
extrajudicial administrative proceeding and do not contain an objection to the legality of
Lisa's requested change of child support. Nowhere in these citations does Corey assert
that the trial court is prevented from modification under the Utah Code. The mere fact
that ORS was mentioned does not satisfy the preservation requirement. A party must
specifically raise an issue and cite legal authority or evidence supporting his position.
OVea at f 18. Corey's argument on appeal, that U.C.A. §78B-12-210(8) bars
modification, is not preserved by the limited mention of ORS as cited by Corey.
Although Lisa was aware that ORS refused to ask for modification, she nevertheless
asked the court to modify support. Corey acquiesced by not objecting after Lisa made
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plain her requested relief. Lisa's mere recitation of ORS's position did not preserve this
issue on appeal. In this context, Corey had an affirmative duty to object to the propriety
of modification. Failure to do so constituted a waiver of this issue on appeal. Without an
affirmative objection, the issue of whether child support could be modified was never
fairly presented to the trial court.
Because the argument Corey advances here was not presented to the trial court and
because Corey does not assert plain error or exceptional circumstance, this court should
decline further review on appeal. See Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) (Rule
24 requires arguments of plain error to be expressed in party's Brief); hunt v. Lance,
2008 UT App 192, \ 24, 186 P.3d 978 (because party failed to argue grounds excusing
preservation such as plain error or exceptional circumstances, court refused to rule on
issue raised).
Second, Corey challenges the trial court findings of fact, asserting that other than a
"cursory reference to the monthly incomes of Mr. and Mrs. Davis, no single finding, nor
piece of rational is given" for the modification to the child support award. Again, Corey
has failed to marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and
then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App
216, f 6, 138 P.3d 63 (mem). Accordingly, his challenge must fail.
Despite Corey's assertions to the contrary, the trial court made sufficient factual
findings to justify the child support award. The trial court found that one of the children
had turned 18, that Corey had an income of $74,979.52 per year that Lisa had an income

of $15,286.00 per year, that Lisa had reasonable monthly expenses of $4,027.99 per
month, that Corey had reasonable monthly expenses of $2,224.00, that these figures were
unlikely to change, and that these figures were appropriate for use in determining child
support. (Record at 675). The trial court found that the figures amounted to a substantial
change in circumstances. These findings establish an adequate factual foundation for the
trial court's subsequent child support award.
Although it is true that a child support worksheet is not included in the findings,
Corey does not allege or show that the trial court's child support award does not comply
with the guideline amounts, or that this has prejudiced him. Rather, he has constricted his
brief to arguing that child support should not have been modified. The trial court's
findings and conclusions of law take account of the parties' income and reference the best
interests of the minor children. Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in
modifying the award and this Court should therefore affirm the result on appeal.
IV.
Corey failed to object to the trial court's retroactive application of the child
support modification and thus failed to preserve the argument for appeal
Corey next claims that the trial court erred in making the child support increase
retroactive to April 4, 2008. Rule 24(a)(5)(A) and (B) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires Corey to include in his brief a citation to the record showing that an
issue has been preserved for appeal, or alternatively a statement of the grounds justifying
review of an issue not adequately preserved on appeal. Corey's brief contains a section
entitled "Statement on Preservation of Issue" at pages 5-6 of his brief. The issue of
retroactive modification of child support is not mentioned anywhere in this section. The
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section does not cite to the record showing where the issue of retroactive modification
was put before the trial court. Further, the section does not include a statement of
grounds justifying review despite failure of preservation.
As noted above, the only citations to the record regarding child support put
forward by Corey in his brief relate to the actions of ORS. This, however, is not
sufficient to preserve the issue of retroactive modification for appeal, because these
references to ORS do not make any mention of Corey's argument. A party must be
specific in his preservation of an issue. See O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, \ 18, 217 P.3d
708.
Therefore, Corey has not complied with the requirements of Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) requiring him to cite his preservation of the retroactive
modification issue. Because Corey has not adequately cited where this issue was
preserved, this Court should refuse to consider it. See Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192,
T[ 24, 186 P.3d 978 (court of appeals may refuse to consider an issue where party fails to
cite to the record showing objection). Further, the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. Connell v.
Connell, 2010 UT App 139, f 24, 233 P.3d 836; Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367, %
17, 38 P.3d 307 (1o preserve an issue for appellate review "a party must first raise the
issue in the trial court giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue"). This Corey
failed to do.
Corey has also failed to assert that extraordinary circumstances exist that excuse
him from preserving the issue of retroactive modification of child support. Although
12

there are exceptions to the general rule requiring a party to preserve an issue for appeal,
such as the plain error doctrine, Rule 24 requires these arguments to be expressed in
Corey's Brief. See Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5). Because Corey has failed
to argue grounds excusing preservation, the Court should disregard his arguments relating
to retroactive modification of child support and affirm the determination of the trial court.
hunt, 2008 UT App 192, \ 24.
V.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the decree to require
Corey to pay one-half of school related expenses.
In her petition for modification, Lisa stated that because she had incurred
additional expenses for the minor children for extracurricular activities, school
registration, test fees, and other expenses, that it would be reasonable that Corey pay onehalf of the expenses incurred for the children for these extra expenses. (Record at 558).
Again, the determination to modify a divorce decree is generally reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61, ^ 7, 157 P.3d 341
At trial, Lisa testified that the minor children had been incurring additional
expenses as they became older. She testified regarding lab fees as well as the many
advanced placement courses the children were taking and their associated costs. (Trial
Transcript at 65:15-25; 66:1-25; 67:1-23). The trial court made the finding that school
expenses "have arisen that did not exist when the decree was entered" and that this
constituted a material change in circumstances. (Record at 677). The court then ordered
that the decree be modified to require Corey to reimburse Lisa for one-half of reasonable
school expenses. (Record at 668).
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Corey claims that the trial court made inadequate findings regarding the school
expenses issue. A party challenging findings of fact on appeal must marshal the evidence
in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. Covey
v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, ^f 27, 80 P.3d 553. Corey does not even attempt to comply
with the marshaling requirement, but rather argues that sufficient evidence does not exist
regarding school expenses without cataloging for the Court what evidence does exist and
why it is insufficient. This court may affirm on this issue alone.
If Corey had properly marshaled the evidence, he would find that it supported the
trial court's finding that there were new and additional expenses and that these amounted
to a material and substantial change of circumstances. The trial court found, after
listening to testimony that Lisa was paying several hundred dollars a year for several new
school fees associated with the children as they got older, that "school expenses have
arisen that did not exist when the decree was entered." (Record at 677).
Corey next claims that the trial court did not specify that these school expenses
were not contemplated by the original decree or the subsequent orders modifying the
original decree. However, the testimony and the trial court's findings specify that the
school expenses "did not exist when the decree was entered."5

5

In support of his argument that the court made inadequate findings, Corey also argues
that the trial court did not limit the school fee award and that even Lisa herself could
make a claim for fees incurred by her for schooling. However, Lisa is not in school, she
has never made a request for reimbursement of her fees, and she will not in the future.
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Corey next claims that school costs are "part and parcel" of the child support
award and the trial court erred in granting them. Counsel for Corey claims that he could
only find the case of Brooks on point for this issue. (Corey's Brief at 26). See Brooks,
881 P.2d 955(Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, Utah courts have awarded or upheld
challenges to fathers being required to pay one-half of school or extracurricular activities
on top of the child support award. Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, ^f 8, f 19, 176
P.3d 464 (court found enforceable requirement that husband pay for children's
extracurricular activities separate and apart from child support order); Arnold v. Arnold,
2008 UT App 17,110 n. 2, 177 P.3d 89 ("requiring the shared payment of private school
expenses is within the discretion of the district court") (citing Star ley v. McDowell, 1999
UT App 46 (mem); Gillette v. Costa, 2007 UT App 104, 2007 WL 858711 (not reported)
(appellate court upheld trial court's order that father to pay for extracurricular activities
and schooling).
Further, as noted above, the trial court found that Corey's failure to pay certain
debts had adversely affected Lisa. Contrary to Corey's assertion, this is an adequate
finding to support a division of school expenses because it lays the factual basis for
court's reasoning. The trial court apprehended that certain expenses were not being
adequately divided between the parties, and that these expenses did not exist at the time
of the original decree. Implicit in the trial court's finding are the subsidiary factual
findings that costs of the children's education had not been shared equally by the parties
and that when coupled with the financial strain borne by the Lisa as a result of Corey's
failures, worked an inequitable hardship on Lisa.
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Corey, applying Brooks, argues that the trial court cannot make orders dividing
non-private school costs, and that in any event the trial court did not have sufficient
evidence to find that the school expenses sought by Lisa were an extraordinary expense.
Corey, however, ignores Lisa's testimony that the parties' minor children were enrolled
in advanced placement classes, that these classes required expenditure beyond normal
school expenses, and that these expenses did not exist at the time of the original decree of
divorce. (Transcript at 65:15-25 through 67:25). Applying the logic of Brooks, contrary
to Corey's assertions, there is evidence of expenses that have arisen outside of the context
of traditional school fees that merited the attention of the trial court and was sufficient
evidence for the finding reached by the trial court.6
In sum, Corey failed to marshal the evidence regarding this issue and he failed to
show that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the decree to require Corey to
pay one-half of the school fees.
VI.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified reimbursement of
medical costs.
Corey contends that the trial court improperly modified the decree when it

required Corey to reimburse Lisa for out-of-pocket health costs when they are incurred,
without having to show proof of actual payment. A trial court's determination to modify
a decree will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT
6

Further, trial courts have continuing equitable jurisdiction to make orders dividing
property and affecting the support of the minor children of the parties. U.C.A. §30-35(3). The child support guidelines are not mandatory, and a court may deviate from
them. U.C.A. § 78B-12-210. The trial court acted within its broad equitable powers
when it assigned Corey half of the responsibility for school expenses.
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App 61, ^ 7, 157 P.3d 341. Corey claims there were no specific findings upon which the
court based the change in having to pay bills merely if they are incurred. He claims the
court stated no reasons to vary from the requirement that a bill only be paid of Lisa shows
proof of actual payment. As stated above, a party challenging findings of fact on appeal
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT
App. 380, f 27, 80 P.3d 553. Corey completely fails to marshal the evidence in
connection with this claim. Rather, he argues that sufficient evidence does not exist for
making the change in payment terms. This court may affirm the trial court's decision on
this issue alone.
Corey claims that the trial court had "no basis" to modify the medical
reimbursement provision of the decree. If Corey had marshaled the evidence, he would
have outlined Lisa's claim in her amendment to her Petition to Modify that Corey "has
failed to make any payments towards medical and dental bills for the year 2009."
(Record at 600). He would have set forth the evidence that at trial Lisa testified that she
usually sends a medical bill to Corey within thirty days for reimbursement, but that Corey
wanted more statements back from Lisa from the medical providers which se was not
able to provide. (Trial Transcript at 100: 2-4). If he had marshaled the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings, Corey would have outlined the evidence that Lisa
testified that Corey is "always asking for more documentation that I don't" have. (Trial
Transcript at 103: 13-14, court interrupted testimony). To remedy these problems, the
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trial court determined that all Lisa was required to do is send the statement to Corey
showing that the bill was incurred and he would be obligated to pay his one-half share.
(Trial Transcript at 100-104). Besides the fact that Corey was requesting more and more
documentation that Lisa may not have and had not made any payments on bills submitted
in 2009, the trial court justified the modification because if Lisa incurred the medical bill
(because she has custody of the children and makes sure their medical needs are met), the
providers could not "come after" Corey for those bills, but that Lisa would be solely
liable. (Trial Transcript at 100: 12-25, 101: 1).
Corey also contends that the trial court violated Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-212
when it ordered that his reimbursement obligations for of out-of-pocket health care costs
are triggered upon Lisa incurring such costs. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-12-212(6)
provides that "the order shall...[require] each parent to equally share all reasonable and
necessary uninsured and unreimbursed medical and dental expense incurred for the
dependent children..." This language provides that each parent becomes liable for an
equal share of medical expenses as they are incurred, not as they are paid by the other
parent. The trial court thus followed the statute in fixing Corey's liability at the time
medical costs are incurred.
Corey, however, argues that he should not be liable for costs of health care until he
has received verification of payment. This argument is not supported by the language of
the statute. Presumably Corey contends that subsection (8) requires verification of
payment as a condition for reimbursement by the other parent. Utah Code Annotated §
78B-12-212(8) provides in its entirety as follows:
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A parent who incurs medical expense shall provide written verification of the cost
and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days.
Although subsection (8) provides that a parent incurring medical cost shall provide
verification of payment of medical expenses, by its plain language the subsection does
not make provision of proof of payment a condition of reimbursement, nor does the
subsection mention reimbursement. The statute simply establishes an independent duty
on the part of a parent to provide proof of payment of medical expenses.
Subsection § 78B-12-212(9) states that a parent failing to provide verification of
payment of medical costs may be denied reimbursement from the other party, but does
not mandate such an outcome. The statute enables a court to deny requests for
reimbursement, but the statute also grants trial courts discretion to establish payment
mechanisms by virtue of language stating that requested reimbursement may be denied
upon failure of verification of payment. See Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, f 17, 160
P.3d 1041 (use of the term "may" in a statute grants trial courts discretion regarding
orders under the statute). Further, the statute in question cites Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
which provides trial courts equitable powers to establish orders for the support of minor
children. The use of the term "may" when coupled with a court's inherent equitable
jurisdiction in this arena enables the trial court to establish payment procedures and
mechanisms affixing liability between the parties for shared child-care expenses.
Corey's interpretation of the statute, requiring verification of payment as a
condition of reimbursement liability, is untenable and would render the language of the
statute contradictory because it would set the provisions of subsection (8) and (9) in
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contravention to subsection (6). Subsection (6) clearly states that reimbursement
obligations trigger upon the cost being incurred rather than payment being made. Corey,
however, asks for the opposite. Courts should interpret statutory provisions in reference
to each other, and should seek to give meaning to the whole of the statute. J J. W. v.
State, Div. of Child and Family Services, 2001 UT App 271, <§ 22, 33 P.3d 59.
Appellant's proposed interpretation would undo the legislature's pronouncement in
Subsection (6) and apportion joint liability only upon payment. The trial court's ruling,
however, corresponds with all sections of the relevant statute.
In this case the trial court found that it was necessary for Corey to be obligated to
pay half of medical bills incurred without verification of payment. This order does not
relieve the Lisa of her statutory duties to provide such verification. Indeed, the trial court
stated that Lisa was required to send Corey a statement of incurred medical services.
(Transcript at 101: 8-16). It merely establishes that Corey's obligations of payment are
not conditioned upon receipt of payment verification. The trial court had the discretion to
reach this conclusion.
VJL The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Lisa's request for attorney
fees.
In her Cross-Appeal, Lisa asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying her request for attorney fees made in her Petition for Modification filed on April

7

To ease confusion, rather than referring to Lisa Davis as Cross-Corey, this brief will
continue to refer to her as Lisa in the sections regarding attorney fees.

A(\

4, 2008.

(Record at 558). "Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in deciding

whether to award attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings." Wilde v. Wilde,
2001 UT App 318, Tf 38, 35 P.3d 341. "The trial court's award or denial of statutory
factors of attorney fees must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested
fees." Kimball v. Kimball, f 45, 217 P.3d 733 (quoting Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008
UT App 11, f 10, 176 P.3d 476); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1).
The trial court must make sufficient factual finding regarding the three statutory
factors. See Mark v. Mark, 2009 UT App 374, If 21, 223 P.3d 476; Connell v. Cornell,
2010 UT App 139, If 32, 233 P.3d 836 (there must be sufficient evidence regarding
financial need of receiving spouse, ability of other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness
of requested fees). Failure to consider these factors is grounds for reversal on the
attorney fee issue. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

8

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the judge explained the difference
between an order to show cause and a petition for modification, given that the parties
were acting pro se. (Record at 678). Two very different standards apply as to whether
attorney fees can be ordered depending on which avenue for relief is used. The issue of
Corey not paying his share of the medical bills came more appropriately under a motion
to compel analysis, though the relief offered by the court was more in line with a decree
modification. If the court had analyzed the request for attorney fees under a motion to
compel analysis, because Lisa substantially prevailed at the trial court, the court could
have awarded attorney fees. Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ^ 30, 233 P.3d 836;
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) (court may award costs and attorney fees if party
substantially prevailed).
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If a finding by the trial court is so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence, that finding is clearly erroneous. Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App.
380,^27, 80 P.3d 553.
The trial court did not properly consider the three statutory factors and then make
the appropriate findings. The trial court made no finding of Lisa's need, or Corey's
ability to pay. The only finding made by the trial court relates to the reasonableness of
the fee and that finding is not supported by the evidence presented.
The evidence relating to this finding is as follows. After being represented by
counsel in preparing her petition for modification, a few months before trial, counsel for
Lisa withdrew and she began representing herself, also appearing pro se at the trial on
January 28, 2010 regarding the petition for modification.9 At trial, Lisa submitted as
exhibits three invoices from attorney Richard S. Nemelka on work done in connection
with her petition for modification. (See Trial Exhibit 11). The invoices show time billed
on work done by Mr. Nemelka for the Lisa. The first invoice covers work done from
5/8/2009 to 6/27/2009, totaling $623.00. The work included conferences with the client,
revising documents, court scheduling, and drafting responses. The second invoice covers
time billed from July 1, 2009 until July 29, 2009, totaling $265.50. This work included
review of documents, conference with client, drafting answers and drafting certificate of
service. The third invoice covers work done from October 23, 2009 until December 5,
2009, totaling $489.00 and included sending letters, attending a hearing, reviewing

9

Corey also used counsel to file his counter petition for modification but then also
represented himself at trial.
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pleadings, drafting letters, and conferencing. The total amount in attorney fees requested
by Lisa was $1,377.50.
The corresponding pleadings in the record show that at this same time frame,
Richard Nemelka, then attorney for Lisa, filed a notice to submit for ruling on Lisa's
motion to schedule a trial on the petition for modification, (Record at 571), the trial was
rescheduled, requiring Mr. Nemelka's attention (Record at 582), Mr. Nemelka attended a
scheduling conference/pretrial hearing regarding the Petition for Modification, (Record at
588), and he filed an Order from Scheduling Conference. (Record at 604). The record
shows that Corey filed a Counter Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce (Record
at 587), various other motions and requests during this time as well that Lisa's counsel
would have reviewed, including a Motion for Order to Reschedule the modification
hearing (Record at 578) and another Counter Petition for Modification (Record at 596).
The invoices obviously do not cover all the work done by Mr. Nemelka for Lisa in
connection with the petition for modification. For example the invoices are dated after
the petition for modification was filed and no notations for drafting the Petition for
Modification are included on the invoices. Lisa recognized this fact and testified, in
response to the judge asking the amount of fees incurred relating to the modification
petition, that "I only gathered what I could get, which is not even half of what I've
occurred with Nemelka. He's been in physical therapy and operations. So it's been kind
of hard to get a hold of him and try to get all the invoices from the last two years." (Trial
Transcript at 8:8-15). The judge then responded, "But you are seeking those fees," to
which Lisa answered, "Yes." (Trial Transcript at 8:16-18).
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The judge asked Lisa if the invoices were from her attorney and if they were her
attorney fees. Lisa answer yes. Corey even stated, "They are her attorney fees, your
honor. It's okay. (Trial Transcript at 75:4-5). Later in the trial, the judge states,
"Attorney fees," "You've incurred them." (Trial Transcript at 96:8-10).
After trial on the petition, the trial court, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order Modifying Decree, stated that "[t]he evidence at trial was insufficient for
this court to determine attorney fees in this matter, specifically whether the attorney fees
are related to the issues which have been adjudicated here. Accordingly, the court does
not find that attorney fees should be awarded in this case." (Record at 670).
Nowhere in the trial transcript does the trial court question whether the invoices
relate to the modification proceedings. There is no indication from the invoices, the
testimony during trial, or the pleadings filed during the corresponding times, that the
invoiced fees were not for services rendered in connection with the modification
proceedings. Thus, the trial court's finding is against the clear weight of evidence.
Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App. 380, f 27, 80 P.3d 553. Based upon the totality of the
record, this court should find the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the
attorney fee award of $1,377.50.
The court made no findings regarding the parties' financial status in relation to the
payment of the attorney fees. The court did find, in connection to its child support
modification, that Corey is making $74,979.52 per year or $6,248.00 per month and that
he has reasonable expenses of $2,224.00 resulting in a surplus of $4,024.00 per month.
The court found that Lisa, on the other hand, has reasonable expenses of $4,027.99 with
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an income of $1,273 per month and child support of $1,287.00 per month. Id. This
results in a deficit of $1,467.99 per month. From these figures, the court could have
concluded that Corey has a clear ability to pay and Lisa has a substantial need.
Further, Corey failed to contest the admission of the attorney's fees invoices at
trial. The trial court provided an opportunity to object to the admission of the evidence,
but Corey did not. Therefore, this court should find that the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to make specific findings in its denial of an award for attorney's
fees. This court should remand the case to the trial court to make a determination
whether an award of attorney fees is warranted based upon the statutory findings
regarding evidence of the financial need of Lisa, the ability of Corey to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fee.
VIIL Lisa is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal
In her Cross-Appeal, Lisa requested attorney fees incurred on appeal. "Generally,
when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the party who then substantially
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." Kimball v.
Kimball 217 P.3d 733 (quoting Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, \ 29, 200 P.3d
223); see Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("[W]hen fees in
a divorce case are granted to the prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn
prevails on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on appeal."); Schaumberg v.
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Even if a party was not awarded attorney fees by the trial court, an appellate court
may award attorney fees on appeal if the party prevails on appeal and if the trial court
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should have awarded attorney fees below. Kimball, 2009 UTApp 233, f 52. As
discussed above, the trial court should have awarded attorney fees to Lisa.
While Lisa has few assets compared to Corey, she has been forced to expend
considerable financial resources toward responding to this appeal, in which Corey
appealed issues with very little money value. This obviously takes away precious assets
from her three children.
If Lisa prevails in large part on the issues raised by Corey on this appeal, this court
should exercise its discretion and award attorney fees to Lisa on appeal. The case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees reasonably
incurred on appeal.
Conclusion
This court should and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
modifying the prior decrees in this case. This court should affirm the trial court's
decision to modify the decree regarding child support payments, regarding Lisa's right to
claim both minor children as exemptions for tax purposes, regarding Corey's duty to pay
one-half of school related expenses, and regarding Corey being required to pay medical
bills as they are incurred, rather than upon proof of payment by Lisa.
Further, this court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
award attorney fees and in failing to make proper findings as required by statute in
awarding attorney fees in a modification action. This court should also award attorney
fees incurred by Lisa on appeal. This court should remand the case to the trial court to
make sufficient findings regarding Lisa's financial need, the ability of Corey to pay
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attorney fees, and the reasonableness of the requested fees and to make a finding
regarding the amount of attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this "ZJ day of October, 2010.
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Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LISA DAVIS,

VERDJDED PETITION FOR
DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
COREY G. DAVIS,
1
Respondent.

CMNo.
Judge

Petitioner alleges as follows:
1.

That the Petitioner is a resident of Utah County and has been for at least three

months prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

That the parties were married on the 4th of February, 1993 in Salt Lake County,

Utah and ever since have been husband and wife.
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Thai during the marriage various irreconcilable differences have arisen between

the parties making i1 impossible for Petitioner to continue the marriage and based thereon
Petitioner is entitled to a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony between the parties
herein.
4.

That Petitioner is not aware of any other litigation involving the parties of the

minor children beingfiledin any other court.
5.

That three minor children are born as issue of this marriage to-wit: StflftM

bornDecember 2,1991, Kayla born October 7,1994, and Cierra born January 23,2001. It is
reasonable that the Petitioner be awarded the sole care, custody and control of said minor children
with the respondent being awarded reasonable rights of visitation pursuant to Utah Code 30-3-35
and that each party be bound by the advisory guidelines contained in Utah Code 30-3-33.
6.

It is reasonable that the Respondent pay the Petitioner child support in an amount

determined by the parties' gross monthly income and the statutory schedule with said child
support continuing until the minor child reaches 18 or their normal class graduates from high
school, whichever occurs last and to be paid one-half by the 5th and one-half by the 20th of each
month. Further, it is reasonable that a Universal Withholding Order be put in to full force and
effect forthwith.
7.

That the Petitioner is in need of support and maintenance and the Respondent is

capable of providing the same and, therefore, it is reasonable that the Petitioner be awarded
alimony in an amount sufficient to meet her needs and that said alimony also be paid pursuant to

2
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the Uniform Withholding Order. It is reasonable that said alimony continue until the Petitioner
remarries, cohabits or the length of the marriage.
8.

That it is reasonable that the Respondent maintain health and dental insurance for

the minor children and that each party pay one-half of the children's portion of said premium plus
one-half of any and all non-covered medical and dental expenses, including but not limited to
medical* dental, orthodontic, optical, therapeutic, prescriptive, deductibles and co-payments.
9.

It is reasonable that the Respondent maintain life insurance in a reasonable amount

on his life naming the minor children as beneficiaries thereon until such time that child support
terminates.
10.

That during the marriage the parties have acquired a home and residence located

at 44 East Horseshoe Road in Saratoga Springs, Utah and it is reasonable that the Petitioner be
awarded all the parties' rights, title and interest in and to said home and residence together with
the furniture and furnishings located thereon.
11 .

That during the marriage the parties have acquired certain items of personal

property and it is reasonable that the same be divided in an equitable manner.
12.

That during the marriage the parties have acquired certain debts and obligations

and it is reasonable that the Respondent assume and pay said debts and obligations and hold the
Petitioner harmless therefrom.
13.

It is reasonable that the Respondent be allowed to claim the three minor children

as dependents for tax purposes as long as he is current in his child support and alimony
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obligations until such time that the Petitioner becomes employed full time, at which time
Petitioner would be allowed to claim one-half of the children as dependents for tax purposes.
14,

It is reasonable that the Respondent pay the Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs

incurred herein.
15.

Petitioner is in need of temporary support and maintenance as well as temporary

use and possession of the home and residence and the personal property located therein and
temporary custody and control of the minor children. The minor children have been with the
Petitioner for the last two years while the Respondent has worked the majority of the time out of
state. In fact, currently the Respondent is working in the State of California and has refused to
provide support for the Petitioner and the minor children. Since the 1st of September, 2001, he
has only sent to the Petitioner the sum of $500.0(}/Which is totally inadequate for the Petitioner to
meet her needs and obligations. Petitioner has been the primary caretaker of said minor children
and is currently unemployed and provides all care for the minor children's physical, emotional and
mental needs.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court grant unto her a Decree of Divorce
severing the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties and to have such
consistent with the terms and conditions set forth herein above.'
DATED this the J J day of

f^&a

.
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e&A^., Petitioner

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
County of Salt Lake )
LISA DAVES, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she is the Petitioner in the
above-entitled matter, that she has read the foregoing Verified Petition, that she knows the
contents thereof, and acknowledges the contents thereof are true and correct of her own
knowledge, information, and belief

DATED this JfL day of < p g ^

2003.

LISA DAVIS, Petitioner
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this the _K_ day of f^ft
ffcfefy Public
/•• f^mM
« 7110 8. Highland Dn
i^'ftBW/ff? f^J:akeC!tyvUT84121
I ^ « ^ V W My Commission Expires
%$%*&?

L. ^ & f ^

June 21,2004

State of Utah

Notary Signature and Seal

Petitioner's Address:
44 East Horseshoe Rd.
Saratoga Springs, UT 84043
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2001.

rfLED
Fount; Judical District Court
oi Utah County, State of Utah
t
.Deputy

RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN R. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196

±J**L

Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LISA DAVIS,
ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 024400391
COREY G. DAVIS,
Commissioner Patton
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
James R. Taylor of the above-entitled Court on the 21 st day of April, 2005, Petitioner
being present and being represented by her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, and
Respondent being present and being represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver, and
witnesses having been sworn and testified and exhibits having been admitted and at the
close of Respondent's presentation of evidence the Petitioner having made a Motion to
Dismiss Respondent's claim requesting a change of custody and the Court having heard
argument on the same and the Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of
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Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Petitioner's Motion to dismiss Respondent's claims for a change of custody be
and is hereby granted and the custody of the minor children shall remain with the
Petitioner as stated in the Decree of Divorce.
2. The Respondent and the Petitioner shall be bound by the relocation statute,
Utah Code 30-3-37, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference.
3. Both parties be and are hereby ordered to exchange their current addresses and
phone numbers and in the event their address or phone number changes they shall
forthwith notify the other party. Further, when the Respondent has the minor children for
parenting time he shall provide to the Petitioner a contact person and phone number.
4. Respondent be and is hereby ordered to provide to the Petitioner an insurance
card for the minor childrens' health insurance and a description of the benefits as well as
a copy of his life insurance policy or verification of the same as required by the Decree of
Divorce. Said insurance card and description of benefits and the verification of the life
insurance policy consistent with the terms of the Decree of Divorce shall be provided to
the Petitioner forthwith by the Respondent mailing to the Petitioner said documents by
certified mail with a return receipt.
5. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce shall be complied with by the
parties in regard to the medical insurance premiums, non-covered medical expenses and
day care expenses.
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6. Income withholding relief consistent with Utah Code 62(a)-11-502 and other
applicable statutes be forthwith put into effect to enable the Office of Recovery Services
to continue to collect from the Respondent the child support and alimony obligations.
7. It is hereby ordered that the child support obligation be reduced to the sum of
$1,174.00 as of October 2003 and that the Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child
support in the sum of $1,174.00 effective October 2003 and continuing thereafter
pursuant to the terms of the Decree of Divorce. A Child Support Worksheet is attached
hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference.
8. The outstanding judgments for arrearages in child support and alimony be
amended and modified to reflect the change of the child support and alimony obligations
which are both effective October of 2003. Based thereon the total amount of arrearages
in child support and alimony, as of April 12,2005, due and owing by the Respondent to
the Petitioner is the sum of %2H 8!Pb

which includes accrued interest pursuant to

statute.
9. It is hereby ordered that the alimony payment of $1,000.00 per month be
reduced to $700.00 per month effective October of 2003 and that said alimony payments
shall continue until terminated as stated in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce.
10. Petitioner be and is hereby awarded a judgment for attorney's fees in the sum
of $4,000.00 which represents fees incurred by the Petitioner for the numerous Order to
Show Cause hearings on contempt brought before the Court.
11. No award of attorney's fees is made to either party in regard to the Petition
and Counter-Petition to Modify and the trial in the above-entitled matter and both parties
shall pay their own attorney's fees.
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12. It is further ordered that Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner the sum of
$100.00 per month toward the arrearage judgments as stated in Exhibit "C" attached
hereto. Said $100.00 per month shall be paid to Petitioner's attorney on a monthly basis
beginning forthwith.
13. That all other provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force
and effect.

DATED this P

<-r-/ .

s
day of April, 3005

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
D. BRUCE OLIVER

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to the following,
postage prepaid, this *%& day of April, 2005:
D. Bruce Oliver
Attorney at Law
180 South 300 West Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
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30-3-37. Relocation.
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from the
residence specified in the court's decree, that parent shall provide if possible 60 days advance written
notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice of relocation shall contain
statements affirming the following:
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved by both parties will be
followed; and
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to court ordered parent-time
arrangements, or the schedule approved by both parties.
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, schedule a hearing with
notice to review the notice of relocation and parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and
make appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time transportation.
(3) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the transportation costs, the court shall
consider:
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation;
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising parent-time;
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant.
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order the parent intending to move to pay the costs
of transportation for:
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and
(b) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the court
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, upon the relocation of one of the parties the following
schedule shall be the minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child:
(a) in years ending in an odd number, the cMldjshall spend the following holidays with the.
noncustodial parent*
(i) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday until Sunday; and
(ii) the fall school break, if applicable, beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the
day before school resumes;
(b) in years ending in an even number, the child shall spend the following holidays with the
noncustodial parent:
(i) the entire winter school break period; and
(ii) Spring break beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the day before school
resumes; and
(c) extended parent-time equal to 1/2 of the summer or off-track time for consecutive weeks. The
week before school begins may not be counted as part of the summer period.
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order uninterrupted parent-time with the
noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during extended parent-time, unless the court finds it is
not in the best interests of the child. If the court orders uninterrupted parent-time during a period not
covered by this section, it shall specify in its order which parent is responsible for the child's travel
expenses.
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the relocating party shall be responsible for all the child's
travel expenses relating to Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and 1/2 of the child's travel expenses relating to
Subsection (5)(c), provided the noncustodial party is current on all support
obligations. If the noncustodial party has been found in contempt for not being current on all support
obligations, he shall be responsible for all of the child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless the
court rules otherwise. Reimbursement by either responsible party to the other for the child's travel
expenses shall be made within 30 days of receipt of documents detailing those expenses.
(8) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of divorce.
(9) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing.

httD://www.le.state.utus/^code/TITLE30/htm/30 03047 htm
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YjSiTA HON SCirEDULK FOR CfFILDREN
UNPrrAl 5 VICARS OF AGE
U FAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35 5
FOR CHILDREN UNDER 5 MONTHS:
(1)
(2)

Six hours per week preferably divided inio 3 visitation periods in the custodial
home, established child care setting or other environment familiar to the child; and
Two hours on holidays and years specified in Subsections 30-3-3 5(f) through Q)
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting or other
environment familiar to the child.

FOR CHILDREN 5-10 MONTHS:
(1)

(2)

Mine hours of visitation per week preferably divided into 3 visitation periods In the
custodial home, established child care setting or other environment familiar to the
child, and
Two hours on holidays and years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(f) through (I)
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting or other
environment familiar to the child.

FOR CHILDREN 10-18 MONTHS:
J |)
(2)
(3)
(4)

One -eight -hour-visit-per week; and'
One three-hour visit per week, and
Eight hours on holidays and years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(f) through (i);
and
Brief phone contact at least two times per week during reasonable hours for a
reasonable duration.

FOR CHILDREN 18-IVIONTHS TO 3 YEARS:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

One weekday evening from 5.30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.; and
Alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree
from 6*00 p.m on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, and
Visitation on the holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(c) through (i); and
With 30-day notice, extended visitation two one-week periods, separated by at
least four weeks, with one week being uninterrupted, the other subject to visitation
by the custodial parent. The-custodial parent shall have an identical one-week
period of uninterrupted vacation; and
Brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent two times per week during
.reasonable hours for a reasonable duration

FORCHrLDREN THREE YEARS OLD, BUT YOUNGER THAN FrVE:
Same as 18 months to 3 years except extended visitation is two-week periods with one
wo-week period of uninterrupted visitation
,[Tcaivc date May 5. I°97
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COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERMTY)

TS.

&AJH

0fi*s~J

CivilNo

MOTHER

Q 2 V ^ j V O 3 <? /

FATHER

1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for
whom support is to be awarded.
2 a Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to
Instructions for definition of income.
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter
alimony ordered for this case).
2c. Enter previously ordered child support (Do not enter obligations ordered
for the children in Line 1).
2 d OPTIONAL' Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present
Home Worksheet for either parent
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2 a This is the Adjusted Gross Income for
child support purposes.
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 1
to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it
here.
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.
6. Multiply Line 4 b y l i n e 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the
Base Support Obligation.
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount(s) from Line
6 or enter the amounts) from the Low Income Table per U.C ~A- 78-45-7.7.
The parent(s) without physical custody of the child(ren) pay(s) the amount(s)
all 12 months of the year.
8. Which parentis) is the obligor?

Mother

vZ~ Father

Both

9. Is the support award the same as the guideline amount(s) in line 7? (&£es ( ) No
If NO, enter the amount(s) ordered: $
(Father)
$
(Mother) and answer number 10.
10.

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
() other:

Attorney Bar No... V l &c I

( ) Electronic filing ( ) Manual filing
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6/2000

COMBINED

EXHIBIT "C"
JUDGEMENTS FOR CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMONY, MISC., AND INTEREST

Child Support Alimony

Fees

Misc. Interest

Total

1. 4-8-03 Order

$2,870

$1,700 $225

$480

$5,275

2. 6-26-03 Order

$4,044

$4,000

$1,000

$904

$9,948

3. 12-16-03 Order
(May 03-Sept 03)
$7,555 Owed
$2019.24 Paid
$5535.76 Balance

$5,535.76

$5,000

$1,053

$11,589.26

4. 4-21-05 Trial Ruling
( Oct. 03- Jan. 04)
A. Child Support
$18,784 Owed
($17174/Month)

$4,074 (Including Alimony) $4,000

$8,074

B. Alimony
$11,200 Owed
($700/Month)
C. Collection O.R.S.
$25,910
D. Child Support and
Alimony Balance
Due

Grand Total
Through
January '05

$18,784
$11.200
$29,984 Owed
$25.910 Paid
$ 4,074 Due
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$34,886.26

RtEu
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
/A^P^'O^

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Lisa Davis,
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
Petitioner,
Case No.: 024400391
vs.
Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor
Corey G. Davis,
Respondent.

The above matter was heard before the Honorable James R. Taylor of the Fourth District
Court on April 21, 2005. The Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Richard S.
Nernelka. The Respondent was present and was represented by his attorney, D. Bruce Oliver.
Witnesses were sworn and testified and exhibits were admitted. At the close of Respondent's
presentation of evidence and information regarding a change in circumstances since the original
decree, the Petitioner made a Motion to Dismiss Respondent's claim requesting a change of
custody. The Court having heard argument on the same and the Court having heretofore made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

Page 1 of 5
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1. Petitioner's motion to dismiss Respondent's claim for a change of custody is granted,
custody of the minor children shall remain with the Petitioner as stated in the Decree of Divorce.
2. The Respondent and the Petitioner shall be bound by the relocation statute, Utah Code
§30-3-37 and §78-45-7.11.
3. Both parties are ordered to exchange their current addresses and phone numbers and in
the event their address or phone number changes to forthwith notify the other party. Further,
when the Respondent has the minor children for parenting time he shall provide to the Petitioner
a contact person and phone number.
4. Respondent is ordered to provide the Petitioner an insurance card for the minor
children's health insurance and a description of the benefits as well as a copy of his hfe insurance
policy or verification of the same as required by the Decree of Divorce. The Respondent shall
immediately mail the documents by certified mail with a return receipt
5. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Decree of Divorce shall continue to determine recovery for
medical insurance premiums, non-covered medical expenses and day care expenses.
6. The Office of Recovery Services may continue to execute upon existing judgments for
arrearages in child support and alimony for orders signed on April 8,2003 and June 26,2003,
which encompass October 2002 through April 2003. As of April 21, 2005, the total still
outstanding for these judgments is $2,872.40 in principal and $8.16 in accrued interest for
alimony and $1,280.91 in principal and $3.64 in accrued interest for child support.

Page 2 of 5
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7. The child support obligation is reduced to the sum of $1,174.00 beginning in October
of 2003. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support in the sum of $1,174.00
effective October 2003 and continuing thereafter pursuant to the terms of the Decree of Divorce.
8. Petitioner is granted judgment for arrearages in child support for the time period May
2003 through April 2005 which includes the change of the child support obligation effective
October of 2003. Based on evidence received, the total amount of arrearages in child support
due and owing by the Respondent to the Petitioner for the time period beginning May 2003
through April 12, 2005 is $10,120.25 with interest accruing at the statutory rate.
9. It is ordered that the alimony payment of $1,000,00 per month be reduced to $700.00
per month effective October of 2003 and that those alimony payments shall continue until
terminated as stated in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce.
10. Petitioner is granted judgment for arrearages in ahmony for the time period
beginning May 2003 through April 12, 2005 which includes the change of the alimony obhgation
effective October of 2003. Based on evidence received, the total amount of arrearages in
alimony for time period May 2003 through April 12,2005 is $7,025.91 with interest accruing at
the statutory rate.
11. Income withholding relief consistent with Utah Code § 62(a)-l 1-502 and other
applicable statutes is allowed to enable the Office of Recovery Services to continue to collect
child support and alimony obligations from the Respondent.

Page 3 of 5

68

12. The Court does not find the Respondent in further contempt because Respondent had
made substantial payments toward child support and alimony.
13. Previous contempt sanctions will be held in abeyance so long as the Respondent pays
$100.00 per month to Petitioner toward the arrearage judgments for child support and alimony.
14. This order does not alter previous judgments for attorney fees, included in the Orders
of April 8, 2003, June 26,2003 and December 16,2003, which total $4,000, with interest
accruing.
15. Neither party shall be awarded attorney's fees in regard to the Petition and CounterPetition to Modify and the trial in this matter.
16. The Divorce Decree is modified to entitle Respondent to claim the youngest child,
Cierra as an exemption. The Petitioner may claim the middle child Kayla as an exemption. The
provision alternating the use of the oldest child, Shian, as an exemption is not modified. This
Court orders that if one party is unable to make any benefit from any exemption(s), then the other
party is entitled to full use of the exemption(s).
17. All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce shall remain in full force and effect.
Dated this I'lf day of

<3^

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
Page 4 of 5
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Davis v. Davis, Memorandum Decision
Copies of this Decision mailed to:
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Richard Nemelka
6809 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Counsel for the Respondent:
D. Bruce Oliver
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490

Mailed this ol J day of

i/M

2005, postage pre-paid as noted above.

PCU^

Court Clerk
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6

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 So. 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PETITION TO MODIFY

LISA DAVIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
COREY G. DAVIS,

Civil No. 024400391
Commissioner Thomas Patten

Respondent.
COMES NOW Petitioner, Lisa Davis, by and through her undersigned counsel of record,
Richard S. Nemelka, and respectfully petitions the Court and alleges as follows:
L A Decree of Divorce and a subsequent Order Modifying the Decree were entered in the
above matter in regard to claiming the children as tax dependents, ordering the Respondent to pay
debts and cosign for Petitioner to buy a house.
2. There have been the following changes of circumstances justifying a modification of the
Orders of the Court:
A. The Respondentfiledbankruptcy and no longer is paying the debts he was ordered
to pay.
B. The Petitioner's credit has been ruined by the Respondent's failure to pay the
debts as ordered by the Court.
71
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C. The Petitioner has incurred additional expenses for the minor children for extra
circular activities, school registration and test fees, and other expenses.
D. The Petitioner has a greater need to claim the minor children as dependants.
E. Petitioner desires to purchase a house.
3. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be allowed to claim all of the minor children as
dependants for tax puiposes since Respondent has not cosigned on a loan for the Petitioner to buy
a house, and no longer has to pay the marital debts..
4. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay one-half of the expenses incurred for the children
for their extra circular activities and school registration and test fees.
5. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay Petitioner's attorney's fees if this matter is
contested.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court modify the Decree and subsequent Orders
consistent with the terms and provisions as stated herein.
DATED this

day of March, 2008..
NEMELKA & NEMELKA

RICHARD S. NEMELKA
Attorney for Petitioner

2
72

hfJJ
4 ™ DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH '
UTAH COUNTY

LISA DAVIS
PROSE
851 NEWBOILD CIRCLE
MEDVALE,UT 84047
801-568-2666

flHN V07 23

IN THE FOURTH JUD1CIDAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

LISA DAVIS,

ANSWER TO SUMMONS

Petitioner,

AND PETITIONS THE COURT

vs.

TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

COREY DAVIS,
Respondent.

Civil No. 024400391

THE STATE OF UTAH TO COREY DAVIS:
COMES NOW Petitioner, Lisa Davis and respectfully petitions the court also providing
answers to said summons, alleges as follows:
1. A Decree of Divorce and a subsequent Order to Modifying the Decree were entered in
the above matter in regard to claiming the children as tax dependants, ordering the Respondent to
pay debts.
2. There have been the following changes in circumstances justifying a modification of the
Orders of the Court:
A. The Respondent filed bankruptcy and no longer is paying debts he was
ordered to pay.
B. The Petitioner's credit has been ruined by the Respondents failure to pay the
debts as ordered by the court
C. The Respondent was also Ordered in the Decree of Divorce to pay the
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mortgage payment on the house until sold. With the Respondent failing to do so, the house was
foreclosed upon.
D. The Respondent was court ordered to pay First National bank of Omaha in the
Decree of Divorce. Since he filed bankruptcy, this credit card company is presently taking the
Petitioner to court for the amount of $15,000.00.
E. The Petitioner has incurred additional expenses for the minor children for extra
circular activities, school registration and test fees, and other expenses.
F. Hie Petitioner has a greater need to claim the minor children as dependants.
Since the Respondent only visit's the children once a year.
G. The Respondent has failed to provide W-2's and tax returns as court ordered.
H. The Respondent has failed to provide proof of life insurance for the past years.
3. It is reasonable that the Petitioner be allowed to claim all three as dependants for tax
purposes. This benefit's the children seeing how the children live with the Petitioner.
4. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay one-half of the expense incurred for the
children for their extra circular activities and school registration fees and test fees.
5. The Petitioner has fulfilled all obligations of Decree of Divorce.
6. The Respondent has failed to provide a Hst of eye care providers. Since the Respondent
is in fact the primary provider.
7. The Respondent has failed to provide any statements or any list of providers for
medical and dental under the Respondents insurance plan. Therefore, he should still be
responsible for one-half
8. The Petitioner has provided proof of all payments made by the Petitioner on all
medical and dental.
9. The Respondent has also failed to make any payments towards medical and dental bills
for the year 2009.
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10. The Respondent was behind $268.00 at the time the airfare tickets were purchased.
The Respondent had told the children he would pay for the tickets this year because he was behind
In medical expenses owed the Petitioner. And they were going to L. A., Calif. Not Newport
Oregon where the Respondent resides.
11. The Petitioner requests a judgment be made of $494.42. This amount is one-half
Medical and Dental expenses the Petitioner has already paid for the year 2009.
12. It is reasonable the Respondent pay for all air fare for the children from this day
forward.
13. It is reasonable the Respondent show proof of life insurance coverage for the past 7
years. Since the Petitioner has not received proof of such. There should be no change in the
amount of the life insurance policy.
14. It is reasonable to adjust the child support amounts with income verifications of taxes.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court modify the Decree and subsequent Orders
consists with the terms and provisions as stated herein.
DATED tins r)\

day of November, 2009.

LISAD5\TS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the answer and petition to modify via United States
mail, postage prepaid, on the

day of November, 2009, to the following;

Corey Davis
11415 NE Coos St
Newport, Oregon, 97365
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JTH BI3T&ICT
STATE OF UTAH
U-VLH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LISA DAVIS,

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order Modifying Decree

Petitioner,
v.

Date: February 17,2010

COREY G. DAVIS,

Case No. 024400391

Respondent.

Judge David N. Mortensen

This matter came before the court for bench trial January 28,2010. Both parties
represented themselves. This court reviewed the pleadings with the parties, received testimony
and evidence, and listened to the arguments of the parties. The matter is before the court on
petitions to modify a divorce decree. Now being fully apprised in the matter, the court enters the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and enters a order modifying the decree.
Findings of Fact
This matter arises out of a decree which was entered on May 23,2002. The matter has
been subject to almost continual disagreements, the first petition to modify having been filed
only five months eifter the initial decree. This decree was last modified April 10,2006 when the
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court terminated alimony based upon cohabitation.
The court discussed at the trial of this matter the difference between an order to show
cause and a petition to modify. This difference is not one of semantics, and if correctly
understood by the parties, that understanding may lead to a more orderly future. If either party
believes that the other party is violating the terms of the decree or any specific modification
thereof, that party is free to file an order to show cause. An order to show cause will be quickly
dispatched by a court commissioner. An order to show cause does not need to go through a fullblown trial. In other words, an order to show cause may be addressed far more efficiently and
quickly, which will be to all parties' benefit
A petition to modify a decree, on the other hand, involves circumstances where the party
must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred and that the actual terms of the
decree should be changed. As should be obvious, if one is claiming a violation of a previous
decree, one would not bring a petition to modify, since the party is not seeking to modify the
decree, but to enforce it.
The latest petition to modify was filed April 4,2008 by Mrs. Davis. A counter-petition
was filed November 5, 2009 by Mr. Davis. A document was filed November 23,2009, entitled
"Answer to summons and petitions the court to modify decree of divorce," which this court takes
as a counter-petition to the counter-petition. This court finds that the respondent has declared
bankruptcy and that by virtue of that bankruptcy filing, the creditors are now seeking to recover

2
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funds from the petitioner. Although the respondent claims that the petitioner's financial status is
a function of mismanagement of her ownfinances,the court was presented with little evidence of
that being the case. The court finds that the home previously shared by the parties was
foreclosed upon. The courtfindsthat the initial decree provided that respondent would pay for
certain debts. The court finds that those debts have not been paid. The court therefore finds that
although bankruptcy was a right respondent could and did invoke, that by so doing he has
effectively taken from the petitioner the benefit of her bargain in arriving at the stipulation which
forms the basis of the original decree.
This court finds that a material change in circumstances has occurred. One of the
children has now turned 18. Further, the bankruptcy of the respondent has materially affected the
financial condition of the petitioner. Finally, issues of school expenses have arisen that did not
exist when the decree was entered.
While issues more properly brought in an order to show cause hearing should not be
addressed in these proceedings, since both parties failed to object to receiving evidence
concerning the same, this court intends to resolve them now.1 This court finds that air fare has
been incurred in connection with respondent's exercise of his summer visitation in the amount of
$543.60, half of which is $271.80. Although these tickets were for a vacation with respondent in
California, instead of Oregon where he resided, the tickets are still relatively cheap.

l

See Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b).
3
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Additionally, there was no evidence presented that on the dates in question a flight to Oregon
would have been cheaper. Therefore, the court finds that respondent should be reimbursed
$271.80frompetitioner.
The court finds that under the present decree of the court each party claims one dependent
on their taxes and then they trade every other year taking a tax deduction for the third child. The
previously entered decree required the respondent to obtain life insurance in the amount of
$150,000. However, in the interim time one child has turned 18 years of age. The petitioner on
behalf of the children has incurred medical expenses of $374.61 (including eyecare) which have
not been reimbursed by the respondent. A dispute has arisen amongst the parties as to whether
the petitioner must take the children to an eye care professional covered by respondent's
insurance plan, or in other words, whether the respondent can force the petitioner to take the
children to a provider inside the plan when going to a plan provider which will cost more money
than going to another provider outside the plan.
The court also finds that the parties incomes have changed significantly, most
significantly being that of the respondent. The last court order to specifically address the
incomes of the parties was entered October 26,2005. The court noted that at the time of the
decree in May of 2002 the respondent's gross monthly income was $7,000 per month and the
petitioner's gross monthly income was zero. The respondent had testified that he lost his
employment, but the court noted that his gross income for the year 2002 was $95,000. In
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October 2003, the respondent obtained his then-current employment through which he made
$5,026 per month. The court found that as of October 2003, respondent's income had reduced
approximately 29%. Although the petitioner was still employed, the court found the petitioner
could work full time and imputed to her the minimum wage of $940 per month. The court
therefore found it was reasonable that the child support obligation should be reduced to the sum
of $1,174 beginning October 2003. On April 10, 2006, the court entered an order modifying the
decree so that no alimony was owing.
The court finds that the reasonable expenses the petitioner incurs monthly are $4,027.99
as testified to in court. The court finds that the reasonable monthly expenses of the respondent
are $2,224 as testified to in court. The court also finds that, based upon his last paycheck in
2009, respondent is making $74,979.52 per year, or $6,248 per month. The court received no
evidence that this amount would likely diminish in the future. Accordingly, this courtfindsthat
this amount should be used for the determination of child support.
In contrast, petitioner claims income of $15,286 per year, or $1,273 per month..
Minimum wage is currently $7.25 per hour which equates to $15,080. This court agrees with
previous rulings which have found in this case that minimum wage should be imputed to the
petitioner. But since she claims that she makes slightly more, the higher amount should be used.
Using thesefiguresthe court determines that the respondent's child support obligation is $1,287
per month.
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The court finds that the purpose of life insurance provisions and decrees is to ensure that
child support obligations will be paid into the future. Multiplying out the monthly obligation of
the respondent for the remaining time his children will be under the age of 18, the courtfindsthat
a policy in the amount of $ 150,000 in Ufe insurance is no longer necessary. The court
specifically finds that a total of $115,000 of life insurance should be in force and that this amount
will protect the children in this matter as to the support associated with them. The court has
specifically considered the present value of money. If the respondent were to die today and the
Ufe insurance were paid and reasonably invested, that investment would produce a net income of
more than $115,000.
The court further finds it is reasonable that the petitioner be able to verify the in force
nature of life insurance policy. Accordingly, respondent to shall be required to submit
documents proving the enforce nature of a life insurance prop up policy every six months.
Should respondent failed to provide the documentation, or should the documentation show any
period of a lapse policy, the court may require the policy to be maintained by the petitioner, with
a financial obligation for the premium to be assigned to the respondent. Alternatively, the court
could find respondent in contempt and enter a judgment against the respondent.
Finally, the $115,000 in life insurance should only list petitioner Lisa Davis and the
children of this marriage as beneficiaries or payees in the event of respondent's death. If the
$45,000 policy provided through respondent's employment requires the Usting of a spouse, then
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respondent will need to obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $115,000.
The court finds it reasonable that the financial impact of the children should be as little as
possible. It is not in the interest of any party to waste money. Accordingly, the petitioner is
required to use eye care professionals within respondent's health insurance plan, unless she can
obtain those services and products cheaper through another source. If they are obtained from a
cheaper source, respondent is still responsible for one half of the expenses related to vision care.2
The court finds that because of the financial impact the bankruptcy has had upon the
petitioner, the petitioner should be able to claim all the tax exemptions for all the children.
Accordingly, the wife is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from claiming the
minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he complies with the following
requirements:
A.

He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year;

B.

He is current in his child support obligation for the preceding calendar year;

C.

He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from claiming the exemptions;
and

D.

He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax consequences would be for

2

The court has noted an assertion by respondent that he should be freed from an
obligation in the decree to co-sign on a home loan should the petitioner attempt to purchase a
home. The court was provided no basis to change that provision of the decree. Therefore, the
co-sign obligation remains in full force and effect.
7
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the parties.
When the respondent has met the aforementioned conditions, the petitioner shall immediately
sign and return the documents required by the Internal Revenue Service to permit the respondent
to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax year.
As the court indicated to the parties at trial, a question existed as to whether the court
could consider the respondent's post-decree filing of bankruptcy and reconsider the obligations
of the parties. The answer under Utah law is "Yes." In the case of Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748
P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988), the court was faced with a situation where a party to a divorce
declared business and personal bankruptcy and ceased making payments for the benefit of the exspouse, thus causing her to assume thosefinancialresponsibilities. In the initial stipulations
before the court, the wife had expressly waived anyrightto receive alimony. The Utah Court of
Appeals looked to the case ofBeckman v. Beckman, 685 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1984) where the Utah
Supreme Court examined another bankruptcy situation in a divorce case. In Beckman, the
defendant was discharged in bankruptcy subsequent to a divorce decree in which he was ordered
to make payments on debts and to hold his wife harmless from them as described in a settlement
agreement The trial court found that the obligation to pay marital debts was a support obligation
which was not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The Utah Supreme Court agreed.
Essentially, the courts are enforcing decrees under a contract theory, looking at the
agreement between the parties to a divorce. When parties negotiate and agree upon terms to
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settle their divorce and entry into the stipulation incorporating those terms, the stipulation is an
enforceable agreement. When a respondent such as Mr. Davis agrees to assume and pay certain
debts for the benefit of a petitioner such as Mrs. Davis, that is a promise upon which the
petitioner can rely. While the creditors no longer can go against the respondent because of the
bankruptcy, the petitioner can because the original decree in this matter placed upon respondent
obligation to pay those bills.
The Kinsman court explained:
When defendant willfully avoided his required performance through
bankruptcy, he failed to perform the condition precedent. Having failed
to perform, he now seeks to enforce the agreement against plaintiff.
Such a result will not be tolerated. Failure of the material condition
precedent relieves the other party of any obligation to perform. The
stipulated agreement is no longer enforceable against plaintiff. The
court is placed in the position as if there had been no agreement and no
distribution of property. The court should look to the present condition
and needs of the parties and enter judgment accordingly.
Id. at 213.
Thus, in the present circumstances, this court must look to the current financial needs of
the parties and make a determination offinancialmatters. This court finds that the bankruptcy
filed by respondent is a breach of the condition of the original stipulation and decree that he pay
certain marital debts. The only remedy sought by the petitioner is that she receive the financial
benefit of the tax deduction. The court agrees this will be a just and fair result given that
respondent has failed to perform.
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The court has also noted that the present decree does not require the parties to mediate
before bringing matters before the court. This should be changed. For any issues in the future,
the parties must first submit the matter to good faith mediation before bringing the matter before
the court. Additionally, where the decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming
reimbursement must submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred,
or the claim will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but
need only show that it has been incurred.
The evidence at trial was insufficient for this court to determine attorney fees in this
matter, specifically whether the attorney fees are related to the issues which have been
adjudicated here. Accordingly, the court does not find that attorney fees should be awarded in
this case.
Conclusions of Law
Based upon the findings above, the court concludes that:
1.

The petitioner on behalf of the children has incurred medical expenses one half of
which is $374.61.

2.

Respondent should be reimbursed $271.80frompetitioner for one half of the
travel expenses for respondent's visitation.

3.

The medical expenses and travel expenses offset each other. Accordingly,
judgment will be entered against respondent Mr. Davis in the amount of $102.81.
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4.

The respondent's child support obhgation is $ 1,287 per month retroactive to April
4, 2008, the date the petition to modify was filed.

5.

Petitioner is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The
husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from
claiming the minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he
complies with the following requirements:
A.
B.
C.
D.

He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year;
He is current in his child support obligation for the preceding calendar
year;
He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from claiming the
exemptions; and
He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax consequences would
be for the parties.

When the respondent has met the aforementioned conditions, the petitioner shall
immediately sign and return the documents required by the Internal Revenue
Service to permit the respondent to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax
year.
6.

$ 115,000 of life insurance shall be in force at all times. Respondent shall be
required to submit documents proving the in force nature of a life insurance policy
every six months. Should respondent fail to provide the documentation, or should
the documentation show any period of a lapse policy, the court may require the
policy to be maintained by the petitioner, with a financial obligation for the
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premium to be assigned to the respondent. Alternatively, the respondent may be
held in contempt for failure to keep a life insurance policy or policies in the
amount of $ 115,000 in place. The $ 115,000 in life insurance should only list
petitioner Lisa Davis and the children of this marriage as beneficiaries or payees
in the event of respondent's death. If the $45,000 policy provided through
respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then respondent will
need to obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $115,000.
7.

The petitioner is required to use eye care professionals within respondent's health
insurance plan, unless she can obtain those services and products cheaper through
another source. If they are obtained from a cheaper source, respondent is still
responsible for one half of the expenses related to vision care.

8.

The decree is hereby modified to require respondent to reimburse petitioner for
one half of reasonable school expenses.

9.

For any issues in the future, the parties must first submit the matter to good faith
mediation before bringing the matter before the court. Additionally, where the
decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement must
submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, or the
claim will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been
paid, but need only show that the expense has been incurred.

12

87

10.

Attorney fees are denied.

11.

All other claims for relief are denied.

The decree is so modified.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated February 17,2010.

'"V-3*
Judge David N. Mortfgf§Vgg&*%$
Fourth Judicial District;'

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LISA DAVIS,

ORDER ON MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE
DECREE
(JANUARY 28,2010)

Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 024400391
Judge David N. Mortensen

COREY DAVIS,
Respondent.

This Court, having heard this matter on January 28, 2010, and good cause appearing
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Judgment is entered against Respondent in the amount of $ 102.81. This amount

represents the difference between the amount Petitioner has incurred in medical expenses, one
half of which is $374.61, and the amount Respondent has incurred in travel expenses, one half of
which is $271.80.
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2.

Respondent's child support obligation is raised to $1,287 per month, retroactive to

April 4, 2008.
3.

Petitioner is awarded the tax exemption for the minor children of the parties. The

husband has the option of paying the wife any tax benefit she would derive from claiming the
minor children as exemptions and claiming exemption himself, if he complies with the following
requirements:
A.

He notifies the wife on or before February 15 of each year;

B.

He is current in his child support obligation for the

preceding calendar year;
C.

He pays the wife the tax benefit she would derive from

claiming the exemptions; and
D.

He pays for an accountant to determine what the tax

consequences would be for the parties.
4.

When Respondent has met the aforementioned conditions regarding claiming the

tax exemption, Petitioner shall immediately sign and return the documents required by the
Internal Revenue Service to permit the Respondent to claim the exemptions for the applicable tax
year,
5.

Respondent maintains $115,000 of life insurance in force at all times.

Respondent is required to submit documents providing the in force nature of a life insurance
policy every six months. Should Respondent fail to provide the documentation, or should the
documentation show any period of a lapse policy, the court may require the policy to be
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maintained by the Petitioner, with a financial obligation for the premium to be assigned to the
Respondent. Alternatively, the Respondent may be held in contempt for failure to keep a life
insurance policy or policies in the amount of $115,000 in place.
6.

The $115,000 in life insurance only list Petitioner Lisa Davis and the children of

this marriage as beneficiaries or payees in the event of Respondent's death. If the $45,000 policy
provided through Respondent's employment requires the listing of a spouse, then Respondent
must obtain a stand alone policy in the amount of $115,000.
7.

Petitioner is required to use eye care professionals within Respondent's health

insurance plan, unless she can obtain those services and products cheaper through another
source. If they are obtained from a cheaper source, Respondent is still responsible for one half of
the expenses related to vision care.
8.

The decree is hereby modified to require Respondent to reimburse petitioner for

one half of reasonable school expenses.
9.

For any issues in the future, the parties must first submit the matter to good faith

mediation before bringing the matter before the court.
10.

Where the decree provides for reimbursement, any party claiming reimbursement

must submit evidence of incurring bills within 30 days of the bill being incurred, or the claim
will be waived. The party need not show that the bill has actually been paid, but need only show
that the expense has been incurred.
11.

Attorneys fees are denied.

12.

All other claims for relief are denied.
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Dated t h i s ^ d a y of April, 2010.

Approved as to form:

David Hartwig
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MODIFICATION OF
DTVORCE DECREE was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the \ 2 day of April, 2010 to:
David Harrwig
1817 South Main Street #17
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Attorney for Respondent

An employee otffchnstensen Wo,
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Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statues, or rules.
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30-3-3
Title 30 - Husband and Wife
Chapter 3 - Divorce
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title
78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an order of custody, parenttime, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to
pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable
the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the
action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the
party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees
or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the
reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money, during the
pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any
children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be amended
during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment
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30-3-5
Title 30 - Husband and Wife
Chapter 3 - Divorce

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children —
Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time —
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following
in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and
dental expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-ofpocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles;
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent
children; and
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which
health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of
Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both
parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations,
or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current
addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery
Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court
determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be
adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother
and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and
other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.
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(b) Upon a specificfindingby the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court
may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among
other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation
schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was
without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation
order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parenttime right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of
the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(hi) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's
skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend
school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony
on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of
living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective
standards of living.
(e) When a marciage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered
in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and
awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the
condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
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regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the
time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of
the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of
annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another
person.
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78A-4-103
Title 78A- Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 4 - Court of Appeals
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and
process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of
Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
and
(ti) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a
first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated
or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the
sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board
of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and
paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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78B-12-212
Titie 78B -Judicial Code
Chapter 12 - Utah Child Support Act
78B-12-212. Medical expenses.
(1) (a) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be
provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost.
(b) The court shall, in accordance with Section 30-3-5, designate which health, hospital, or dental
insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary if at any time
a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans.
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses, the
court or administrative agency may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance unless the court finds good cause to
order otherwise.
(4) The parent who provides the insurance coverage may receive credit against the base child support
award or recover the other parent's share of the children's portion of the premium. In cases in which the
parent does not have insurance but another member of the parent's household provides insurance
coverage for the children, the parent may receive credit against the base child support award or recover
the other parent's share of the children's portion of the premium.
(5) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The
premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of
persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant
case.
(6) The order shall, in accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(l)(b), include a cash medical support
provision that requires each parent to equally share all reasonable and necessary uninsured and
unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred for the dependent children, including but not
limited to deductibles and copayments unless the court finds good cause to order otherwise.
(7) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the other
parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C Section
601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of Recovery Services under
Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier,
premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date the parent first knew or should have known of
the change.
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and payment
of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring medical expenses may
be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the
expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (7) and (8).
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Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings
and in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment
or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the
names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears
immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references,
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out
verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the
citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under
paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, .statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
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challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the
request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited
in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in
all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as
part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions
of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or
document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed
except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments
to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,1
"the taxpayer," etc.
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(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original
record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of
published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of
each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered
page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to
exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility
of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the
evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50
pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of
contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions
of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals,
paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a
notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court
otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages,
and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in
the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in
the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of
Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of CrossAppellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the
Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good
cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this
rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional
pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days
before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief
is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief
for in camera inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal
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number of additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or
denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than
one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part
of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to
the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state
the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words.
Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.
Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 24(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re Beesley, 883
P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To
successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's
advocate. 'Attorneys must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the marshalling duty..., the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" ONEIDA/SLIC, v. ONEIDA Cold
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 1994) (alteration in
original)(quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991)).
See also State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah App. 1991); Bell v. Elder, 782
P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard
of review and citation of supporting authority.
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